Albion's Seedlings

The scary thing right now is that the situation, from a logistics standpoint, is similar to the one Germany faced just before WWII. The American military is vastly larger and more advanced than any other military in the world (as was the German military), but American manufacturing capability has been hollowed out and is dwarfed by China's (as Germany's was by America.)

I'm not convinced fully automated manufacturing is necessary, or even nanofabrication for that matter. Fabbing technology (such as Neil Gershenfeld's fab lab at MIT, or Adrian Bower's RepRap project at the University of Bath) could prove sufficient, and it's much closer to leaving the lab. If every home had it's own factory (and the beauty of a working RepRap is that it could go from functioning prototype to universal appliance within about a year), able to churn out basically any consumer good you cared to name, China's manufacturing advantage would basically disappear. Why buy consumer goods from China (which have to be shipped from the other side of the world) when you can just buy raw materials at the local hardware store and make those goods yourself, at minimal cost and effort? This would eliminate American dependance on Chinese manufacturing, and provide a massive source of 'citizen's manufacturing' that could be tapped in wartime.

Regarding the media problem raised by Mr. Peters, well, he's not wrong exactly. But, he doesn't really take the internet into account, and while old media is certainly dominated by bitter ex-marxists, the internet is a far more even-handed forum. I've got a private suspicion that the old media might actually be useless in a Machiavellian way: when Islamists (or the Chinese politburo) turn on CNN or read the translated version of the NYT, they get the idea that our culture is weak, decadent, and lacking in confidence (which makes them overconfident) and that, furthermore, that media can be counted on to demoralize the homeland in event of war (meanwhile, enough people at home are getting their news via the internet that the media's demoralization effects are largely neutralized.)

Yes, desktop manufacturing is the next step -- and will prefigure what nanomanufacturing will look like, in terms of its structural econmomic impact, in some markets. And media disintermediation, starting with the blogosphere, will be one big difference between the last thirty years and the next.

Generally, iit would seem the best way for us to deal with these sorts of problems is to push ahead with what we've always done best.

Would China and the US ever get into a Knock-down-dragged-out War? I wonder.... Separated by the width of the Pacific and both equipped with modern over the horizon weapons and orbital intelligence; would it even be physically possible? Other than something at the level of a "border squabble" (Taiwan), why and how would they. Both sides have too-much to lose, and would scramble to re-assert peaceful relations and commerce....even while posturing and banging-drums.

Assuming some great blumber or catastrophe, the Pheonix-nation that arises out of the ashes of the Communist-led People's Republic is more likely to be the "other" special-relationship. In their modernization they are confronting many of the same cultural and economic-questions the United Staes did in the 19th and 20th Centuries...and their ties to the Golden Mountain will create a culture that reflects the Anglosphere than it does Japan or Continental Europe. Just as we looked to Britain, China will be looking to the Anglosphere and the United States for it's queues.

It will not be bump-free, but I don't think it will be Cold War-2 either. Both militaries will have to stay on their toes, and they will be some pushing and shoving amonst the proxies; but both sides are to mutually-vulnerable for WW-5.

Peters writes well, and from a base of considerable experience. If he has something say, we'd be nuts not go give it a fair hearing.

All the same, I wonder if perhaps his own biases are blinding him and prompting him to take logical shortcuts. Consider, for example, his early example about our enemies already being expert at network-centric warfare "at pennies on the dollar". Well, sure, they did knock out the World Trade Center Towers without any fancy comms or weaponry. But it was a fairly large effort on their part and might well have been interdicted if the FBI had had the right mindset. Meanwhile, if we wanted to knock down the largest buildings in Riyadh (or Kuala Lumpur, if you want a comparably-large building) couldn't we just launch an adequate supply of cruise missiles at the target on fairly short notice? And then do the same thing tomorrow, to another target? And tomorrow, and tomorrow, and ...

I don't think these things are at all commensurate in the way Peters seems to think so.

And again, he's quite right about the cost-effectiveness of the suicide bomber, but missing the point when he complains that "nothing in our trillion-dollar arsenal" is a match for him. At least in this case he quickly rights himself and argues (correctly) that it's a matter of will and mindset.

In summary, I guess I'm a bit concerned that Peters is leaning into the contrarian role a bit for its own sake (kind of like Col. Hackworth arguably did in his later years.)

What I have noticed is that China's growing affluence and middle income units have made them dependent on luxuries and the goodies of life. Take them away, and they'll bitch and moan, and the CCP can expect their popular support to shrivel up like a dry prune.

You think they'll support a long, drag-out war any more than the US citizens will? Even for Taiwan?

I don't think so. Nationalism is strong, true, but under it all, the chinese are notoriously individualistic, looking out for number one: themselves. Not China, not the CCP. The belief of their communitariam commitment is shattered the moment one considers the sheer amount of corruption and bribery in the country.

The scenario I am most concerned about is a step-by-step vicious cycle caused by each side misestimating the others' reactions. If for example, the Chinese economic expansion took a big downturn, and the people became impatient with the Party, some of the Party bureaucrats might be tempted toward a "Falkland solution" -- pressuring Taiwan in order to work up nationalist sentiment and distract the public. This might involve some hard military pressure that could escalate into missiles fired, and American ships and planes could end up being lost. This could lead to an American armed response, and thus start an escalation. Having gone to the brink, and stirred up nationalist sentiment, the Chinese leadership might find it hard to back off at that point without loss of face.

The American political system often assumes that a shock of military force can be calculated to get it what it wants -- as with the air campaign against Serbia. But that approach would be counterproductive with China.

There are lots of historical examples of war creating its own momntun, espacially between two systems as different as America's and China's. The first step in avoiding it is to admit that it might happen.

One further note: Peters declares that there is no technological fix to the the suicide bomber. This isn't quite true, I think, it just requires a bit of creative thinking.

Read the alt-history/sci-fi comic 'Spiders' at e-sheep (http://www.e-sheep.com/spiders/). The writer, Patrick Farley, imagines two technologies that would make a difference.

The first occured to me about two days after 9-11: a vast number of cheap, disposable, satellite-linked surveillance robots, which anyone could drive around and look through for free. Dump them by the ton on any problem-zone, with the understanding that so long as terrorism and suicide bombing is a danger, no one in the area gets any privacy.

The second is a sort of peace gas. It's a one-two punch: the first part temporarily disables the enemy's will to fight by producing an MDMA-like effect, so that he's too busy thinking 'I love EVERYONE' to fight. The second part permanently disables the enemy's will to fight by introducing a retrovirus that massively stimulates the growth of connections in the part of the brain governing empathy, thus making even the thought of violence deeply troubling to the affected person.

I'm not saying these are the solution, but they're not improbable and would certainly make a difference.

Haven't we gotten the definitive answer to the second solution in Serenity?

No way to the peace gas, even if it works 100%. Can you imagine tyrants rubbing their hands in glee?

TWG

Oh, and the above two examples are just more examples of what Ralph Peters is describing as our predilection to 'more technology!' as the answer to all our problems.

I'm not saying they aren't important, but the will and courage of good men in a fight can NEVER be replaced.

Just watched Jet Li's new movie, Fearless, a fictitous adaptation of legendary wushu master Huo Yuan Jia. Awesome, and in many ways, it shows how the conviction of men can move even their enemies.

The movie also had an important theme: the greatest enemy could be ourselves. Is the chinese government listening? Or will they become their own worst enemies?

We have another probelm in these confrontations, and that is our Calvinist predispostion to focus on our own sins and weaknesses and to ignore those of others. I neve hear any discussion of rising China's weaknesses - their lopsided development, the political tensions coming out of economic development - the Google mess - and Maoist ideas of revolt against injustice - various little land wars in the countryside.

I also never hear any discussion of China's options ofr dominance besides war. Maybe peace didn't scratch our drama itch quite the same way. Our reliance on Chinese manufactures is always cited as a weakness, when in fact it is a form of dominance - we take so much of their output that they have no choce but to keep us going if they don't want all the development of the past 25 years to collapse. The customer is always right. This is why they have been propping up the dollar, or at least not pulling it out from under us.

I am sure they have done the calculus and have decided they stand to do better with us than without us, and much better than against us. The whole history of China for the last 2,000 years is bringing foreign elements into their system and flourishng - and whenever they have stopped that, they have gone backward. If I can see that, they certainly can too.

All the technological suggestions are fun to talk about, but you can only ride that horse so far. The consttuency for that kind of thing is very storng and entrenched, while the constituency for the real needs - language competence, cultural competence - is weak. It will always be like thsi; high tech projects and contracts are always going to be bigger than language training contracts. That just determines what the market is going to offer us, not what we may actually need in the situation.

I never understood how the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs marked anything more than a new buzzword for the sort of force-concept identified by Charles DeGaulle in his seminal book, Army of the Future (1934), and updated with new technology ever since.

Colonel Peters is right to focus on the limitations of current military thinking but like many officers writing from the professional culture he is confronted by a basic dilemma. The source of our difficulty in Iraq and other low-tech situations is not inadequate military doctrine but the simple fact that we do not allow ourselves to use Saddam Hussein's methods.

There has always been a correlation between public support for a war and the war's intensity x length. The question, as in every war, is not whether the public should tolerate a level of sacrifice, but whether the ends are compelling enough (or if one cannot admit that ends are ever inadequate, are "communicated" compellingly enough) to justify this level for the duration necessary. A policy that is easily defeated by a partisan press cannot be absolved of all blame for its defeat.

If we are in trouble, it is because we need a better context in which to fight religious extremism, so that there is some way to recognize difficulty as a temporary setback. We may need in a less open-ended way to see the larger path to an acceptable outcome so that failures of effort in the short-term do not hold us hostage to immediate events.

I agree with Jim. I have read countless articles about the coming clash with China and not one of those brings into play the point that Jim made so nicely. Why would you kill your biggest customer? If China subverts the US, who is going to buy all of that stuff that they keep making?

The rational future is: China makes a soft transition to something more like constitutional democracy; the engine of development starts to reach the backlands, and China gradually opens up like Taiwan and South Korea did before. They buy our bonds, we buy their exports. In that future, I'm not worried. or rather, i'm worried about a different set of problems not concerning China.

Now, what percentage probability do I put on the above future? Above 50%? Maybe. Above 75%? No way. Now, what percent probability do I put on the "Falklands war escalates out of hand" scenario? Above 25%? No way. Below 5%? I don't think so either. Somewhere between 5% and 25% probability is a zone that's worth devoting somee mental effort to.

I wonder what the odds would have looked like if Intrade had been around in 1913.

"The rational future is: China makes a soft transition to something more like constitutional democracy; the engine of development starts to reach the backlands, "

The constituency in China that wants that to happen is large and getiing larger, and holds almost all the power.

Development in the hinterland - there are problems, but nothing insurmountable. Guangdong has boomed partly due to having a well-deveoloped infrastructure both of roads and port facilities, and also of inter-supporting suppliers. Expanding that into Shaanxi or Hubei or wherever will be a gigantic challenge, about like building the Grand Canal.