November 04, 2006

Harrison -- The Central Liberal Truth

Harrison, Lawrence E., The Central Liberal Truth: How Politics Can Change a Culture and Save It from Itself, Oxford University Press, 2006, 272 pp.

[cross-posted on Chicagoboyz]

To my mind, the Anglosphere discussion is part and parcel of a resurgence in interest in cultural matters after both communism, and vast amounts of post-WW2 Western international aid, failed to provide dramatic economic successes in the poorest parts of the world. The events of 9/11 have highlighted the disparities across the planet, their seeming intractibility, and the view that the rich part of the planet should be solving the problem.

Recently, I reposted a book review of Lewis's Power of Productivity, which noted that only a single large nation has moved from relative per capita economic poverty to economic prosperity ("being rich") in the twentieth century -- Japan. And Japanese history in the 20th century was hardly without its tragedies. Accordingly to the current numbers, we aren't likely to see another sizeable country make the leap to notable GDP per capita prosperity any time soon. If the 20th century, despite a massive increase in global GDP, has essentially kept every nation running in place, what can be done to give nations with low or medium prosperity an effective boost?

Lawrence Harrison's experience in Latin American foreign aid with USAID from 1962 to 1982 gave him first hand experience with both the great expectations of the times and with the dashed hopes of subsequent decades. After he retired from public service, he wrote Underdevelopment is a State of Mind (1985), Who Prospers? (1992) and The Pan-American Dream (1997). All were cataloging the ways in which cultural habits affect the economic and civic progress of the region he knows best. By 1999, he was involved in a symposium at Harvard chaired by Samuel Huntington on the relationship of cultural values and human progress, which in turn led to the creation of the Culture Matters Research Project (CMRP) established at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. The Central Liberal Truth is a summarization of several years of that project's research on the cultural values affecting economic progress in many nations (by scholars and commentators from around the world) . The book also outlines a few theories of cultural change, a typology of values for progress-prone and progress-resistant nations, and wraps with some guidelines for "progressive cultural change."

The title of the book comes from a well-known aphorism by Daniel Patrick Moynihan:

The central conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, that determines the success of a society. The central liberal truth is that politics can change a culture and save it from itself.

If scholars like Huntington, Fukuyama, and Landes make the case that cultural inheritance influences national history, the obverse question is "how do you alter cultural habits to support national success?"

With evident sincerity, Harrison sets about establishing firstly that culture matters, with an early chapter discussing the contrasts between Haiti and the Dominican Republic ... sharing an island yet almost a world apart in economic conditions. Then he highlights how an increasing number of scholars and experts are returning to a focus on cultural values after a half-century of disappointment with international aid and development, and finally, he asserts that programs must be put in place to systematically leverage cultural change for economic progress.

Some time ago, Argentine journalist Mariano Grondona evolved a typology of values which can categorize cultures according to their response to change. No country has established an "ideal" but clearly the progress-prone and -resistant countries share many attributes, and do so in evident patterns. The Culture Matters Research Project started with Grondona's lists and revised it into the following:

Categories for Typing Progress-Prone and Progress-Resistant Cultures

1. Religion
2. Destiny
3. Time Orientation
4. Wealth
5. Knowledge

Values, Virtues
6. Ethical code
7. The lesser virtues
8. Education

Economic Behavior
9. Work/achievement
10. Frugality and prosperity
11. Entrepreneurship
12. Risk propensity
13. Competition
14. Innovation
15. Advancement

Social Behavior
16. Rule of law/corruption
17. Radius of identification and trust
18. Family
19. Association (social capital)
20. The individual/group
21. Authority
22. Role of elites
23. Church-state relations
24. Gender relationships
25. Fertility

For each of the 25 parameters, there are mirror-images in attitudes ... for example, Item 1 Religion. A progress-prone culture "nurtures rationality, achievement; promotes material pursuits; focus on this world; pragmatism." A progress-resistant culture "nurtures irrationality; inhibits material pursuits; focus on the other world; utopianism."

At the heart of the typology are two fundamental questions: (1) Does the culture encourage the belief that people can influence their destinies? (2) Does the culture promote the Golden Rule? p.55

Harrison would make the case that there is some sort of "universal progress culture" which is independent of race and ethnicity and has more to do with wide-shared, and constantly inculcated, expectations and attitudes.

Turning to his colleagues, Harrison then evaluates the world's cultures based on reports created for the project by scholars, journalists, and experts. Here we can see some careful tap-dancing as the writers try to "accentuate the positive" without totalling abandoning the idea that culture influences economic and material success. Information collated from the World Values Survey, the UN Human Development Index, Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, and the UNDP Arab Human Development Reports all make an appearance, and justifiably so. It's a compelling part of Harrison's argument that so many of these independent reporting tools seem to match the classification of nations according to the CMRP typology.

Two chapters are used to cover the globe from the perspective of cultural values with some thoroughness. Examples from Meiji Japan and Turkey, and more recently, Quebec, Ireland, Singapore, and Spain are described as case studies where noticeable changes in culture had a big impact on economic prosperity. In the course of these chapters, two books are mentioned which I've added to my "to read" list ... Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (on the differences between northern and southern Italy) and John McWhorter's Losing the Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America (on African-American cultural attitudes since the Civil Rights era).

There's also a chapter on eight conscious initiatives (by foundations or governments) in Latin America to directly or indirectly make cultural changes: Peru's Institute of Human Development, USAID programs for voter participation and democracy, Ecuador's Punctuality Campaign, US National Strategy Information Center anti-corruption campaigns, Bogota's poverty priority program, the encouragement of philanthropy, and the "foreign standards" schools. The long-term results of these programs are certainly open to question but I would gather that they are listed in the book as models for how cultural change can be attempted.

Finally, Harrison proposes a set of recommended initiatives for supporting economic progress in nations:

Guidelines for Progressive Cultural Change

I. Child Rearing and Education
A. End illiteracy
B. Study, then modify child-rearing techniques
C. Reform education
D. Learn English

II. Religious Reform
A. Islam
B. Roman Catholicism
C. Orthodox Christianity
D. Hinduism
E. Buddhism
F. Confucianism, Judaism, Protestantism
G. Animist Religions

III. Governments
A. Raise awareness of the key role of culture
B. Look for historic/mythical precedents for cultural change
C. Be alert to developments in other societies that may be applied beneficially at home
D. Give highest priority to education and education reform
E. Pursue open economic policies and encourage foreign investment
F. Build a competent, honest, respected civil service
G. Encourage and facilitate home ownership
H. Regularize property ownership
I. Institutionalize periodic surveys of values, beliefs, and attitudes

IV. Develpment Assistance Institutions
A. Confront culture
B. Integrate cultural change analysis into research programs, strategies, and project design
C. Consider establishing a network of quality universities under international institutional auspices

V. Universities
A. Confront culture

VI. The Media

VII. The Private Sector
A. Philanthropy
B. Participatory Management

Considering the Argument

Harrison does yeoman service by assembling the broader sweep of argument in favour of the role of culture and economic progress. His book is readable, sensibly organized, even-handed, and encouraging to the work of his collaborators on the Culture Matters Research Project. In making the case for culture as an important factor in the design of international aid, he's put his best foot forward. His recommendations are quite sensible, if sometimes betraying a bit of the utopianism he spots in progress-resistance nations. He certainly deserves credit for his work.

He insists that patience, openess to change, the ability to identify a domestic problem and have the desire to fix it, underlie all cultural changes that lead to economic progress. More controversially though, he also declares that such change "cannot be imposed from the outside."

Unfortunately, based on what I've read in this book and others on 20th century history, there's little to suggest that cultures adopt change in the absence of severe external pressure. The timing of such changes, often synchronized with technological changes that temporarily focus power in the hands of a few inspired, and honest leaders, seems to be more influential than any internal reflection and consensus-building. It is a mighty contrast between the modestly successful "best-wishes" efforts listed in one of Harrison's chapters on cultural programs in Latin America, and the traumatic authoritarian shifts executed by Ataturk, Meiji Japan, and Lee Kuan Yew. Less so, granted, for the more peaceful successful economic jumps made by a Quebec, Ireland, and Spain freed from religious supervision, and surrounded by either dynamic indulgent Anglosphere economies or a burgeoning wealthy EU.

It's seems clear to me that "where you are", and "when you make a change" are just as influential as "who you are" and the cultural changes you want to make. And such a constraint may well forestall successful cultural change for much of the 21st century planet.

We can turn to Alan Macfarlane's Origins of English Individualism to see how many centuries specific cultural habits may take to blossom. Or turn to Crosby's Measure of Reality: Quantification in Western Europe, 1250-1600 (review here) to show how difficult it has been for dynamic and prosperous republics to survive for very long, despite their progress-prone cultural styles. Until Trafalgar, I would propose, progress-prone republics were a moving historical target, never sure of survival for more than a century or two. The Pax Anglospherica has, I think, artificially kept alive a number of Harrison's star performers from the 20th century that would otherwise have rapidly fallen underfoot by some predatory neighbour. It's hard to imagine Singapore, or Ireland, or Quebec, or Spain, making their way into prosperity without benign neighbourhoods and considerable political or economic pampering by allies.

And we can also certainly cite Macfarlane's The Making of the Modern World: Visions from the West and East to see how deeply and substantially Japan borrowed from Britain in the late 19th century. An entire style of civic and public discourse was inspected, dissected, then promoted and adopted in Japan, most notably by Yukichi Fukuzawa. And the turmoil of the early 20th century subsequently showed how difficult it was for Japan to make the shift through rapid industrialization without authoritarianism co-opting the public space. Would Japan actually be progress-prone today without the American devastation, American neutering and subsequent management of its politics and culture post-WW2? Is it now, after 60 years, domestically progress-prone?

Reflecting on the industrial assessment of Lewis and the McKinsey company ... the Power of Productivity ... Japan's success in the last half of the 20th century has been very narrowly based, and is (like Harrison's other 20th century success stories - Ireland, Quebec, Singapore, Spain) now facing demographic collapse. It seems a rather Pyrrhic victory to make the shift to progress-prone values only to lose the capacity to reproduce!

And turning to the other example of dramatic cultural change in the 20th century -- Turkey -- I don't think it's disrespectful to withhold judgement on the success of Ataturk's ferocious revolution for another few decades yet, until we see how Turkey manages its population growth, the growing role of Islamists, and its relationship with the EU ... let alone any reconciliation it might have with its neighbours, the Armenians and Kurds.

In sum then, despite Harrison's careful and valuable contribution, I think there's more cause for pessimism than optimism when it comes to conscious domestic programs for cultural change in support of economic progress. And if pessimism is an attitude that's too "progress-resistant" by nature, then perhaps an acknowledgement by the optimists of the very long timeline required for success is needed. American interventions in the Caribbean, for example, have been unrelenting since the mid-19th century, and yet the domestic economies and civil societies of the region return periodically to turmoil. Good intentions do not, unfortunately, translate into permanent positive change. Progress-resistant cultures are, by Harrison's own argument, caught in a self-perpetuating loop that keeps them from identifying and rectifying their own obstacles. Externally-forced change is resented. Internally-forced change is avoided.

Anglosphere Musings

Harrison's book is certainly a useful antidote to the 20th century's enthusiastic embrace of "cargo cult development" ... "just build the dams, roads, and schools and people will transition naturally through the Industrial Revolution." Granted, there's much to be sombre about when looking at the immediate cultural obstacles to prosperity and economic progress facing the West in Afghanistan and Iraq. The questions of "nation-building" and "democracy for all" are meeting a savage test at the moment. But The Central Liberal Truth doesn't help us answer a more modest, and to my mind ultimately more urgent, question.

Just how long does economically-positive cultural change take? Is there time enough?

If we accept Harrison's prescriptions, how much time, money, and indulgence are required for any given society or nation to cast aside their cultural resistance to the habits of mind and behavior that encourage economic development? And can such change take place outside of European culture without cataclysmic events such World War 2 and the Cold War which created East Asia economic dependencies and fiefdoms of the Anglosphere?

More importantly, have the meagre changes that Harrison documents been entirely, or at least partially, enabled by the security guarantees and technological donations of the Anglosphere? The technological imbalance which allowed European nations to impose their will on the world from 1500 to 1950 is now past. The missionary schools which raised several generations of Third World leaders, both benign and malignant, have now been superseded by academies filled with dependency theorists and victimologists. The habits of patience and openness identified by Harrison as the foundation of progress-prone cultures must now compete with First World products and attitudes that are profoundly toxic when they reach the Third World. And the scale of globalized illicit trade now forms a counter-current which can reverse a culture's move to values that are progress-prone. It's hard to imagine, for example, that cocaine has done Colombia or Peru much good.

I'd question whether the modest handful of nations that made the jump to prosperity and progress post-1950 will be matched by many in the 21st century. Poland and the Czech Republic, perhaps. Like Ireland and Spain, countries on the margin of prosperity with intact civic cultures.

Guns and explosives can, as we see every day in the news, brake any attempt to establish the stable progress-prone cultural attributes that Harrison so generously lays out. Nations, societies, and cultures (heck, inner cities) now have the tools and knowledge to resist economic progress. Indefinitely, we might ask? Well, yes, perhaps indefinitely.

It was interesting to read Harrison's book and see no direct references to the English common law countries. Instead, the Nordic "Protestant" nations are lumped into one amalgam. Once more, Finland and Sweden get equal billing with 400 million Anglosphere inhabitants. Whether this oversight was the result of Harrison's politics, or the politics of his colleagues, it's impossible to glean from The Central Liberal Truth. What we can say is that the author's arguments about cultural values go out of their way to ignore the eight hundred pound gorilla in the room.

  • No reference to the so-called LLSV school of economic theory that suggests that a nation's legal system has big implications for its attitudes toward change, progress, and prosperity.
  • No reference to the Pax Britannica and Pax Americana which has altered the global economic and geopolitical landscape over the two hundred years since Trafalgar.
  • No reference, per Lewis, to the commanding lead that Anglosphere nations have, as a group, over their other "Western" progress-prone cultures.
  • No reference to the American effort in applying its values in the creation of the League of Nations and United Nations.

Why Harrison should completely ignore this distinction is unclear. That he does so places great limitations on his ability to sort out why cultures are generally so resistant to progress, and how they might overcome that resistance.

As for his confidence that such polar shifts in attitudes cannot be imposed from outside a culture, I think it is misplaced. As Professor Claudio Véliz so eloquently described in his recent speech at The Anglosphere Institute (The Optional Descent of the English Speaking World) the rest of the world has little latitude to pick and choose when it receives cultural products from the Anglosphere. Whether organized sports, tourism, or technology ... the English-speaking world has created a mass culture (a "vulgar" culture, to be precise) which specifically addresses the needs and aspirations of individuals within a society. It is that culture, that attitude toward change, that provides constant challenge for progress-resistant societies around the world.

The Central Liberal Truth makes a strong case for the role of culture in inhibiting economic and social progress. Readers of Huntington, Fukuyama, and Landes will find much that is familiar ... updated with perspectives from around the world. And the book makes a good case for the elements of society that would need to be rectified in order for a country to shift from progress-resistant to progress-prone attitudes.

The case for how to make such changes in the real world, however, with an Anglosphere now elevated to bogey-man status by its erstwhile "progress-prone" brethren, are singularly unconvincing. By ignoring the gorilla in the room, Harrison has conflated values at the top end of the progress scale which do not belong together ... and has sidestepped historical facts, and inherent economic limitations (drawing on available social capital and equity), that bring his whole argument into question.

He's confirmed the Central Conservative Truth, most certainly. But his case for the Central Liberal Truth is about to be put to the test in our time, our century, with all of us cast as players.

Table of Contents

Introduction [1]
1 Riddle of Hispanola [21]
2 Disaggregating "Culture" [35]
3 Models and Instruments of Cultural Transmission/Change [57]
4 Religions and Progress [87]
5 Culture in Action I [120]
6 Culture in Action II [142]
7 Patterns of Cultural Change [163]
8 Success and Failure [184]
9 Conclusions: Guidelines for Progressive Cultural Change [206]

Posted by jmccormick at November 4, 2006 12:03 PM

The link to continue reading does not work....

Posted by: Alex at November 8, 2006 10:49 AM

Forgive me for straying from the subject matter. I just wanted to say that I fully support what you're doing. A closer relationship between the English-speaking nations of the world is the most natural adventure that Britain could delve into.

Posted by: Sam Tarran at November 13, 2006 03:37 PM

The World Bank had an interesting article on the "Wealth of Nations" that found the major factors in a country achieving affluence included:
Stability and predictbility of Laws protecting the
accumulation of wealth (Rule of Law): Education of the entire populace providing a steady workforce.
These two issues account for over 90% of the intangible wealth of countries.
The Anglosphere did a bit better at spreading the "Rule of Law" concept than most other "colonial powers". It also seems the Anglosphere has done better on education for its citizens. Now we just have to cope with educating and acculturating our immigrant populations.
(Copy below of article summary)
The Intangible Wealth of Nations
Why you're worth more than you think
Ronald Bailey

For the average American living in the United States is like having more than half a million dollars in wealth. So says a new study from the World Bank, Where is the Wealth of Nations?: Measuring Capital for the 21st Century, which makes estimates of the contribution of natural, produced, and intangible capital to the aggregate wealth of 120 countries.

Why are Americans so well off? It's not just because of America's fruited plains and its alabaster cities. In fact, it turns out that such natural and man-made resources comprise a relatively small percentage of our wealth.

The World Bank study begins by defining natural capital as the sum of nonrenewable resources (including oil, natural gas, coal, and mineral resources), cropland, pastureland, forested areas, and protected areas. Produced capital is what many of us think of when we think of capital. It is the sum of machinery, equipment, and structures (including infrastructure) and urban land. The Bank then identifies intangible capital as the difference between total wealth and all produced and natural capital. Intangible capital encompasses raw labor; human capital, which includes the sum of the knowledge, skills, and know-how possessed by population; as well as the level of trust in a society and the quality of its formal and informal social institutions.

Once the analytical framework is set up, what the researchers at the World Bank find is fascinating. "The most striking aspect of the wealth estimates is the high values for intangible capital. Nearly 85 percent of the countries in our sample have an intangible capital share of total wealth greater than 50 percent," write the researchers. They further note that years of schooling and a rule-of-law index can account for 90 percent of the variation in intangible capital. In other words, the more highly educated a country's people are and the more honest and fair its legal system is, the wealthier it is.

Let's consider a few cases. The country with the highest per capita wealth is Switzerland at $648,000. The United States is fourth at $513,000. Overall, the average per capita wealth in the rich Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) countries is $440,000. By contrast, the countries with the lowest per capita wealth are Ethiopia ($1,965), Nigeria ($2,748), and Burundi ($2,859). In fact, some countries are so badly run, that they actually have negative intangible capital. Through rampant corruption and failing school systems, Nigeria and the Republic of the Congo are destroying wealth and ensuring that they will be poorer in the future.

Perhaps one way to think about what it means for the average wealth in the United States to be $513,000 per capita is to think about how much income that wealth produces annually. Not surprisingly, countries with high levels of wealth per capita also produce high levels of income per capita. For instance, in purchasing power parity terms, the United States per capita income is $41,500 annually. This yields roughly an 8 percent return on average wealth.

By comparison, the World Bank study finds that total wealth for the low income countries averages $7,216 per person. That consists of $2,075 in natural capital; $1,150 in produced capital; and $3,991 in intangible capital. By contrast, the average wealth per capita in OECD countries of $440,000 consists of $9,531 in natural capital, $76,193 in produced capital; and a whopping $353,339 in intangible capital.

So if every American has $513,000 in capital, where is it? The vast majority of it is amassed in our political and economic institutions and our educations. The natural wealth in rich countries like the U.S. is a tiny proportion of their overall wealth—typically 1 to 3 percent—yet they have higher amounts of natural capital than poor countries. Cropland, pastures and forests are more valuable in rich countries because they can be combined with other capital like machinery and strong property rights to produce more value. Machinery, buildings, roads, and so forth account for 17 percent of the rich countries' total wealth. And 80 percent of the wealth of rich countries consists of intangible capital. "Rich countries are largely rich because of the skills of their populations and the quality of the institutions supporting economic activity," argues the World Bank study.

As noted above, 90 percent of intangible capital is accounted for by years of schooling and the rule of law. On average, the rule of law explains 57 percent of countries' intangible capital while schooling accounts for 36 percent. The World Bank has devised a rule-of-law index that measures the extent to which people have confidence in and abide by the rules of their society. An economy with a very efficient judicial system, clear property rights, and an effective government will produce higher total wealth.

On the World Bank's rule-of-law index, the United States scores 92 out of a possible 100. The Swiss are even more law-abiding, achieving a score of 99 out of 100. By contrast, Nigeria's rule-of-law index score is a pitiful 4.8; Burundi's 4.3; and Ethiopia's 16.4. The OECD's average score is 90, while sub-Saharan Africa's is 28.

The World Bank study notes, "A one-point increase in the rule of law index (on a 100-point scale) boosts total wealth by over $100 in low-income countries, over $400 in middle-income countries, and nearly $3,000 in high-income countries." So if Nigeria were somehow overnight to become as punctilious as Switzerland, its wealth would rise to $12,168 per person, a $9,420 increase that would more than quadruple the average Nigerian's wealth. If Americans were to become 100 percent law abiding, our wealth would increase by $24,000, or little more than 5 percent.

The report also calculates that a one-year increase in the mean level of schooling in low income countries increases a country's intangible capital by $838 per person. This means that poor countries can get a really big bang for their education buck, since they now spend only $51 per student per year in primary school.

Where is the Wealth of Nations? convincingly shows what countries need to do to create wealth and lift billions of people out of abject poverty. Establish the rule of law and educate people. The big question that the World Bank researchers don't answer is : How can the people of the developing world rid themselves of the kleptocrats who loot their countries and keep them poor?

Posted by: Gray One at November 14, 2006 06:30 PM

We skip the political middlemen, and find ways to educate the young via privately-run schools funded by the philanthropists of the developed nations. That's external aid, but it can also be effective.

The do-gooder leftoids of the West should throw their substantial weight behind such efforts, since even they have to recognise that simply giving money to the corrupt kleptocrats to improve education isn't helping one bit.

For the poor of the developing world, I suspect they're mostly stuck in a disabling and vicious cycle in which they cannot break out of without external aid which I mentioned. Because they're poor, they lack access to education which can give them more viewpoints and a suspicion that things do not have to remain as they are, as serfs to their overlords, democratically elected or not. Without such thought, they cannot even consider to overthrow their corrupt government(and modern overlords are smart enough to give their serfs just enough not to revolt). And so they remain poor.

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